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BY ROBERT M. HUNT
What’s in the File?
The Economics and Law of Consumer
Credit Bureaus
enders in the United States have
voluntarily shared information about their
customers ￿ through credit bureaus ￿
for nearly a century. In this article, Bob
Hunt explains how sharing information about
consumers￿ indebtedness and payment histories can
benefit both consumers and lenders. These benefits
depend, however, on the accuracy of the
information reported and the care taken to ensure
that information is disclosed only when it is
appropriate. Hunt also describes the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, which attempts to address these
concerns. Finally, he closes by reviewing a number of
challenges consumer credit bureaus may face in the
early years of this new century.





Consumer credit bureaus are
organizations that compile and dissem-
inate reports on the creditworthiness of
consumers.1 Firms that lend to con-
sumers provide the underlying data to
the bureaus. In the United States today,
there is at least one credit bureau file,
and probably three, for every credit-
using individual in the country. Over 2
billion items of information are added to
these files every month, and over 2
million credit reports are issued every
day (see Consumer Credit Bureaus in the
U.S.).  In many instances, real-time
access to credit bureau information has
reduced the time required to approve a
loan from a few weeks to a few minutes
or even seconds.
In this article, I examine the
information problems lenders encounter
when making loan decisions and how
information-sharing ￿ through
institutions such as credit bureaus ￿
can mitigate these problems. I then
explore some of the factors that
influence whether lenders will agree to
share their information and credit
bureaus￿ incentives to maintain accurate
credit report files and to correct them
when errors are found. With these
insights in mind, I will examine the
system of regulation adopted to
safeguard privacy and improve the
accuracy of credit bureau files. Finally,
I￿ll review some of the challenges the





problems in conducting their business.
The first problem, adverse selection,
occurs when borrowers are not all the
same ￿ they have different
characteristics that affect the likelihood
they can repay their debts ￿ but
lenders cannot always tell them apart. In
this situation, lenders will offer terms
that depend on the average risk of
default. Since riskier borrowers are more
likely to default anyway, this raises the
cost of a loan disproportionately for the
borrowers most likely to repay.  Hence
the customers most likely to produce an
adverse outcome ￿ defaulting on a
loan ￿ are the ones most likely to
accept the less attractive loan terms.2
The second problem, moral
hazard, occurs if once a loan is made, a
1 This article focuses exclusively on firms that
furnish credit reports on consumers. There
are comparable institutions, such as Dun and
Bradstreet, that collect and disseminate
information on businesses.
2 See the article by George Akerlof and the
article by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss.
Evidence of adverse selection in the market
for credit cards is found in the article by
Lawrence Ausubel.18   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
borrower would benefit by defaulting on
the loan. More generally, a borrower
may not take sufficient precautions to
avoid default. Lenders try to design loan
contracts to deal with this problem, but
that￿s not always possible. In that case,
lenders will lend to fewer borrowers, in
smaller amounts, and on harsher terms.
Sharing information about
borrowers￿ characteristics and payment
histories can mitigate these problems.
Armed with more information, lenders
can better evaluate potential borrowers
and offer loan terms commensurate with
their risk of default. And if future access
to credit is a valuable option to a bor-
rower, he or she will have an incentive
to avoid a default that might become
known to other creditors.
Lenders could share
information about their borrowers by
simply sending it to every lender willing
to reciprocate. But it is clearly more
efficient for lenders to send this
information to a single repository, which
can make the information available to
other lenders when they need it. Such
repositories are the credit bureaus we
have today.
BUT DO CREDIT BUREAUS
JUST HAPPEN?
Should we expect credit
bureaus to emerge as a natural response
to the self-interest of creditors? The
answer is often yes, but not always.3
Economic analysis suggests a variety of
factors can influence the formation of
credit bureaus.
Technology and Market Size.
One important factor is the cost of
establishing and operating an
information-sharing regime.  These costs
may be prohibitive if fixed costs are high
and relatively little lending is going on.
But if loan volume is sufficiently large,
the costs can be amortized over many
loans.  In the U.S., advances in
computing and telecommunications
have reduced the marginal cost of
sharing information but increased fixed
costs because of the required
investments in information technology.
These fixed costs are affordable ￿ in
the U.S. anyway ￿ because the
consumer credit market has become so
large.
Loan volume matters for
another reason: When there is a high
volume of applications for loans of
modest size, lenders cannot afford to
invest a lot of resources evaluating each
application. A credit bureau can help
lenders adopt lower cost techniques for
screening applications ￿ such as credit
scoring ￿ without incurring an
unacceptable rise in overall credit risk.
These methodologies can be refined
using credit histories gathered from all
here are about 1000 consumer credit-reporting
agencies in the U.S., employing 22,000 people
and generating $2.8 billion in sales. If we
control for inflation, industry revenues have
quadrupled since 1972 ￿ twice the rate of
increase of the overall economy or consumer credit.a The
industry is segmented into many small and a few big firms.
The most well-known credit bureaus, Equifax, Experian, and
TransUnion, enjoy universal coverage of consumer borrowers
in the U.S.
The four largest consumer credit bureaus alone
accounted for over half of industry receipts in 1997. These
a This section draws on information from the 1997 Census of Service Industries, the web sites of various credit bureaus, and the web site of the
industry￿s trade association, the Consumer Data Industry Association, or CDIA (http://www.cdiaonline.org). For many decades, and until just
recently, this association was known as Associated Credit Bureaus, Inc., or ACB.
b Prescreening works in the following way. A lender specifies a set of characteristics it wants a set of borrowers to satisfy. Using its files, a credit
bureau identifies those customers who satisfy the criteria and generates a list of names and addresses of people who will receive a credit card
solicitation. The Fair Credit Reporting Act requires that every customer found to satisfy the criteria must receive a firm offer of credit. There
are also limitations, specified in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, on the criteria lenders may use when making credit decisions.
large firms concentrate on high-volume businesses ￿ lenders
seeking credit file information thousands or even millions of
times a year. Some offer credit scoring and other risk
assessment tools and fraud detection services, which attempt
to limit losses by detecting anomalies in consumers￿ credit
files. The largest bureaus offer pre-screening services that enable
firms to send the billions of solicitations for credit cards or
insurance delivered by mail each year.b They are also important
players in direct marketing, generating targeted mailing lists
and, in some cases, printing and mailing billions of items
through their own subsidiaries.
3 This section draws on the articles by Tullio
Jappelli and Marco Pagano, those by Jorge
Padilla and Marco Pagano, and the article by
James Vercammen.
Consumer Credit Bureaus in the United States
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participating lenders rather than just a
lender￿s own files.4
Potential Customers and
Competition.  The advantages of
access to a credit bureau￿s information
will be greater if lenders frequently
encounter potential customers they
don￿t know very much about.  Another
important consideration is the nature
and extent of competition among
lenders.  But here the effects are less
clear cut.  Suppose that a given retailer
or lender enjoys a large share of its
market. Most local residents are already
customers and are relatively well known
to the firm. Unless there is significant in-
migration from other areas, the benefits
of sharing information might be small.
Now consider a large city with
many small lenders and retailers. The
pool of potential new customers will
include both newcomers to the area and
local residents shopping for a better deal.
In that case, lenders might frequently
encounter potential new customers.
Those customers may also borrow from
several lenders at the same time. In that
case, every lender would like to know
how much a potential customer owes to
other lenders before making a loan.  So
it would seem that a more competitive
market is conducive to the formation of
credit bureaus.
But there can be a counter-
vailing effect if a lender￿s profits result
primarily from knowing its own
customers better than its rivals do.
Suppose that one or more lenders
compete for Bank A￿s customers. Once
again, the problem of adverse selection
emerges ￿ loan terms offered by
competitors will be relatively more
attractive to Bank A￿s higher risk
borrowers than its lower risk ones.
Knowing this, other lenders cannot
compete as aggressively for Bank A￿s
customers by offering more credit or
more generous terms. But if Bank A￿s
customers find it difficult to obtain
better terms from other lenders, Bank A
need not offer them the best terms
either, allowing it to earn a profit lending
to customers it already knows relatively
well.
Suppose someone opened a
credit bureau. Would lenders agree to
join? If they did, each lender would be
better equipped to compete for
customers currently served by its rivals
because the adverse-selection problem
would be lessened. But the net effect on
profits is ambiguous ￿ lenders might
earn additional income lending to
customers enticed from their
competitors, but they will also have to
offer better terms to their existing
customers in order to retain their
business. If lenders would not earn
enough lending to new customers to
offset reduced profits earned on their
existing customers, they wouldn￿t
voluntarily join the credit bureau.
Alternatively, lenders might
agree to share some information with
each other, but not everything. For
example, lenders might share
information about delinquencies or
defaults but not about the size of the
credit line and the amount actually
used. Reporting negative payment
information should encourage borrowers
to repay their debts, but it might not
trigger so much competition that sharing
this information would reduce profits.
Joining the Bandwagon.  The
incentive to join a credit bureau tends to
increase with the number of creditors
that agree to participate. Economists call
this a bandwagon effect. Credit bureaus
become more useful to lenders as the
coverage of potential customers
increases. Increased coverage may
reduce moral hazard if borrowers are
aware that their payment history is
available to a larger number of potential
creditors. Additional membership in a
bureau can also help amortize the fixed
cost of setting it up. Each of these factors
would tend to result in just a few credit
bureaus, perhaps only one, serving a
particular market. Today, in most
countries that have private credit
bureaus, just a few firms account for the
vast majority of credit reports generated,
and they enjoy nearly complete
coverage of the credit-using population.
But the bandwagon effect
may not be strong enough to induce all
creditors to participate in information
sharing or to create a monopoly credit
bureau. At a minimum, creditors may
choose to share information with more
than one bureau in order to stimulate
competition and innovation for such
services. Also, the historical trend
toward concentration is not irreversible.
For example, as competitive conditions
change, lenders￿ incentives to continue
sharing information may also change.
CREDIT BUREAUS
 AS BLACK SHEEP?
Consumers care about who has
access to their credit reports and the
accuracy of the information contained
in them. Credit bureaus are concerned
about these issues too. But do they
weigh the benefits and costs of greater
privacy or greater accuracy in the same
way most consumers do? The answer is
probably not. The resulting tension has
been addressed, at least in part, by
government regulation.
Privacy.  Credit bureaus are
information-sharing arrangements that
improve the performance of credit,
insurance, and other markets. But the
flip side of information sharing is a loss of
consumer privacy.  Sharing a little
information about borrowers, such as
delinquencies or defaults, ought to
generate benefits that exceed the costs
associated with any loss of privacy,
especially if access to such information is
limited. But if access is less well
regulated or if information is used for
4 Credit scoring is the process of developing
numerical indices of the risk associated with
consumers with certain observable character-
istics and payment histories.  See Loretta
Mester￿s 1997 article in the Business Review.20   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
purposes not envisioned by consumers,
that case becomes harder to make (see
Credit Reports and Privacy).
The Quality of Credit
Bureau Information. Because no
system is perfect, there will always be
some errors in credit files (see Errors in
Credit Reports). But should we expect to
see one type of error more frequently
than another? The answer is yes. Given
that creditors are also the bureaus￿
primary customers, the standards set by
the bureau will likely reflect the
interests of creditors. A well-functioning
credit bureau will set standards so that
the incremental cost of reducing errors
contained in credit reports is equal to
the reduction in lenders￿ losses that
results from greater accuracy.
Consider a typical lender that
is a member of a credit bureau. The
lender benefits from access to accurate
and timely information provided by
other bureau members, but it bears the
cost of maintaining the quality of
information it provides to other
members. Under these circumstances,
lenders have an incentive to ￿free ride￿
in terms of the quality of the informa-
tion they provide.5  The credit bureau
can mitigate the free-riding problem by
enforcing minimum standards on the
quantity and quality of the information
members provide.
Broadly speaking, two types of
errors can creep into a credit bureau￿s
files: inclusion of inaccurate information
and omission of accurate information.
Suppose that a credit report contains a
reference to a delinquency that, in fact,
never occurred. Based on the informa-
tion in the report, a lender might not
extend credit ￿ but it might have, had
the credit report been accurate.
Consequently, the lender loses interest
and fee income it would have earned
on that loan.
Alternatively, suppose that a
credit report omits the fact that a
borrower defaulted on a loan. In this
case, a lender might extend credit to
this person, but would not have, had the
lender been aware of the default. As a
result, the lender takes on more credit
risk than intended. This type of mistake
he credit-reporting industry has been
embarrassed on several occasions by the ease
with which people have obtained credit reports
when they should not have. For example, a
1989 Business Week article described how Vice
President Dan Quayle￿s credit report was obtained under the
pretext of making him a job offer.  Some deception was required
to obtain the report, but a little deception seemed to go a long
way.
Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), credit
reports may be furnished only for purposes specified in the act,
for example, to lenders making a loan decision, insurers
underwriting a policy, or employers considering a person for
employment.a  The FCRA does permit prescreening (see
Consumer Credit Bureaus in the U.S.) without the prior consent
of the consumer, but consumers have the right to opt out of
this process.b A credit report may be used in an employment
decision, but only with the potential employee￿s prior consent.
Medical information about a consumer cannot be shared with
a A credit report may also be issued to any person with a legitimate business need arising from a transaction initiated by the consumer or with
an existing account with a consumer.  An example might be a credit check performed by a prospective landlord.
b A single toll-free number (1-888-567-8688) can be used to opt out of prescreening services provided by Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion.
c When a consumer report is purchased for resale to an end-user, the identity of the end-user and the proposed use of that report must be
provided to the credit bureau.
Credit Reports and Privacy
creditors, insurers, or employers without the consumer￿s
consent.
Under the FCRA, credit bureaus must use reasonable
procedures to prevent disclosures of consumers￿ information
that violate the act. Users of credit bureau information must
identify themselves and the reason why a credit report is being
sought. Credit bureaus must make a reasonable effort to verify
this information when dealing with new customers.c
The FCRA specifies penalties for violations of
consumers￿ privacy.  A credit bureau or a user of a credit
report found to be in negligent noncompliance with the act is
responsible for the consumer￿s actual damages plus his or her
reasonable legal expenses.  Punitive damages may be awarded
in instances of willful noncompliance. Officers or employees
of a credit bureau who knowingly or willfully disclose consumer
information to a person not authorized to receive it can be
prosecuted. Any person who obtains a consumer report under
false pretenses is subject to criminal prosecution and can be
sued by the credit bureau for actual damages.
5 That is not to say that lenders do not care
about the quality of this information ￿ after
all, the data are typically a direct output of
their own internal information systems.
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Errors in Credit Reports
redit bureaus assemble reports on individuals
by linking accounts with the same names,
addresses, birthdays, Social Security
numbers, and other information that is
supposedly unique to the individual. Credit
bureaus have developed sophisticated processes to do this,
but they are not perfect. Important parts of a person￿s credit
history, such as the payment history on a student loan, may
sometimes be omitted. Or erroneous information, such as a
delinquency on someone else￿s account, might be included.
Perhaps no other issue about this industry
generates more heated debate than the accuracy of credit
reports. For all of that heat, there aren￿t a lot of data
available, and most are old.  In 1992, the industry￿s trade
association released results of a study based on a sample of
nearly 16,000 applicants, all of whom were denied credit.
Relatively few of these people requested a copy of their
credit report, but a quarter of those who did disputed
something in their report. While we don￿t know for sure, it is
likely that serious errors occurred more frequently among
disputed reports than for the whole study sample or the
entire population of credit users.a In about 14 percent of the
disputed reports, the resulting changes were significant
enough to reverse the credit decision. In the study, there
were only 36 such instances (0.2 percent of the sample). But
a simple extrapolation, based on other statistics provided by
the same organization, suggests that in the early 1990s, the
number of applications for credit mistakenly denied could
have been large ￿ in the tens if not hundreds of thousands
each year.b
a The study itself was not made available to the public. The statistics cited here are from a 1992 speech by Barry Connelly of Associated
Credit Bureaus, Inc. (ACB).
b In testimony submitted to Congress, ACB reported that consumers disputed something in 3 million credit reports in 1989: 13.5 percent of 3
million disputes is 405,000. See the 1989 hearings. It should be noted that not all of the 3 million reports disputed in 1989 occurred after a
denial of credit, and this may imply that the 405,000 number is too high. But we don￿t know by how much.
causes lenders the greatest concern.
But balancing costs and
benefits to lenders does not take into
account the interests of borrowers, who
are not directly customers of the bureau.
Borrowers also experience losses from
errors: When a loan is denied because of
erroneous information in a credit report,
the borrower loses the benefit of having
the loan.6 If that loss is not also reflected
in weighing costs and benefits, too many
errors of this type will occur.
When consumers become
aware of mistakes that result in an
erroneous denial of credit, they natu-
rally have an incentive to correct those
errors. Because they know their own
credit history well, it is easier for them to
identify errors than it is for the credit
bureau. Therefore, one way to improve
the accuracy of credit reports is to
encourage consumers to dispute errors in
their reports, setting in motion a process
for rechecking the source and accuracy
of the data reported.
Since lenders value more
accurate data, we should expect credit
bureaus to make some form of dispute
process available to consumers.
However, lenders bear the cost of this
process but enjoy only a portion of the
resulting gains. So we can￿t assume that
credit bureaus will devote appropriate
resources to the dispute process,
especially when the costs of doing so are
high.
Given the difficulties in
forming a private arrangement between
borrowers and credit bureaus, govern-
ment intervention might produce a
better balancing of the costs and
benefits of accuracy.  For example, the
government could set minimum
standards for information providers and
credit bureaus, as well as for the
consumer-dispute process.  The U.S.
and many other countries have enacted
laws with precisely this goal in mind.
THE REGULATION OF
CONSUMER CREDIT BUREAUS
In the U.S., the primary
mechanism for regulating the activities
of consumer credit bureaus is the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which
was enacted in 1970 and  significantly
amended in 1996.7  The primary agency
responsible for enforcing the FCRA is
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
6 More generally, a borrower in this situation
may have to accept harsher loan terms or may
have to expend time and effort to have an
erroneous delinquency expunged from his or
her credit file.
C
7 15 U.S.C §§ 1681-1681(u).  A thorough
description of the law, together with
brochures explaining its obligations in plain
English, may be found at the FTC￿s web site
www.ftc.gov.22   Q2  2002 Business Review www.phil.frb.org
but other federal agencies (including
the Federal Reserve Board) are
responsible for enforcing the act among
firms they regulate.8
In many ways, this law is an
attempt to refine the balance between
the obvious benefits credit bureaus gen-
erate and consumers￿ legitimate con-
cerns over accuracy and privacy. The
FCRA creates obligations for credit
bureaus, users of credit reports, and
credit bureau members.  The duties of
lenders and other information providers
are relatively modest ￿ to avoid fur-
nishing information known to be
erroneous and to participate in the
process of correcting errors identified by
consumers. This increases the quality of
information provided to credit bureaus
without significantly raising the cost of
sharing the information. Regulation
should not raise these costs to the point
where information providers drop out, a
situation that would undermine this
voluntary mechanism for sharing
information.
Similarly, inaccuracies in credit
files do not violate the FCRA. Rather,
the act requires bureaus to use
reasonable procedures to ensure maximum
possible accuracy. This standard is
satisfied if the bureau adopts procedures
a reasonably prudent person would use
under the circumstances. These
procedures, in turn, depend on a
balancing of the incremental benefits
and costs of attaining higher levels of
accuracy.9  This balancing of benefits
and costs may change over time as
advances in technology make it easier
for bureaus to adopt ever more powerful
computers and software.
8 Under the act, state attorneys general may
sue on behalf of their residents.  In addition,
certain state laws provide consumers with
additional rights.
9 These interpretations are found in the 1982
case Bryant v. TRW, Inc. 689 F.2d 72 and the
1989 case Houston v. TRW Information Services,
Inc. 707 F. Supp. 689.
The FCRA also encourages
consumers to correct errors in their
reports. The cost to consumers of
obtaining their own reports is limited by
regulation. The cost is free whenever
information contained in a credit report
has contributed to an adverse decision
affecting the consumer ￿ precisely the
circumstance in which an error may be
more costly. The FCRA requires users of
credit bureau information to remind
consumers of their right to obtain and, if
necessary, correct their credit reports.
The act sets a time limit for reinvesti-
gations to be completed, at no cost to
the consumer, and includes a number of
mechanisms for ensuring that any
corrections are disseminated to other
credit bureaus and users of the report in
question.
This is not to say that the
FCRA has attained the ideal balancing
of benefits and costs that might be
achieved. Consumer groups remain
concerned about the problems of
accuracy and privacy and, in some
areas, question whether the act is
adequate.10  Numerous congressional
hearings in the late 1980s and early
1990s culminated in amendments,
enacted in 1996, that significantly
strengthened consumer protections.
Thereafter, the FTC sued a number of
credit bureaus, alleging they were
devoting inadequate resources to the
consumer-dispute process.11 At the same
time, continued improvements in
10 See Edmund Mierzwinski￿s April 2001
testimony and Jon Golinger and Edmund
Mierzwinski￿s 1998 report, for the Public
Interest Research Group, on the accuracy of
credit reports.
computer and communications
technology have reduced the cost of
investigating alleged errors and
correcting them when found.
WHAT LIES AHEAD?
In the U.S., the two-tier
industry structure ￿ a few giant credit
bureaus with national coverage serving
high-volume customers and many
smaller bureaus serving specific niches or
reselling data to low-volume customers
￿ is likely to mature while adapting to
new forms of delivery, for example, the
Internet. Advances in predictive
modeling such as credit scoring will
likely increase the value of information
contained in credit bureau files. But the
industry also faces new challenges from
governments as well as their own
customers.
Challenges from
Governments.  The industry faces the
prospect of more intense scrutiny and
possibly regulation.  In 2001 the FTC
succeeded in restricting the use of
certain data in consumer credit reports
to generate target marketing lists used to
sell nonfinancial products to consumers.
The FTC also succeeded in applying
the financial privacy requirements of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to credit
bureaus￿ ￿look-up￿ services, whereby a
person￿s name and other identifying
information are matched with a current
address or phone number contained in
Numerous congressional hearings in the late
1980s and early 1990s culminated in amend-
ments, enacted in 1996, that significantly
strengthened consumer protections.
11 In January 2000, the FTC announced a
settlement, involving the three largest credit
bureaus, that requires them to adequately
staff the toll-free lines used by consumers
seeking information about their credit
reports.   Business Review  Q2  2002   23 www.phil.frb.org
13 See the articles by Lisa Fickensher and the
one by Lucy Lazarony. See also the advisory
letter issued by the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council.
credit files.12 And while the 1996
amendments to the Fair Credit
Reporting Act limited the ability of
states to enact new, more restrictive
legislation affecting credit bureaus,
those limits expire in 2004.
Challenges from Lenders.
For a brief period in the late 1990s,
lenders accounting for one-half of all
consumer credit ceased reporting
certain information (credit limits and
high balances) on at least some of their
credit card accounts.  Financial
regulators warned lenders their
underwriting systems might be
compromised by incomplete credit
bureau information.13  The leading
credit bureaus responded by announc-
ing they would limit access to their
databases for lenders providing
incomplete credit histories. Thereafter,
these lenders began to send more
complete credit information to the
bureaus.
This behavior might be a
reaction to a period of intense
competition among credit card lenders.
During this period, an increasing share
of consumers￿ unsecured debt was held
on the books of a few lenders.  In just
five years (1996-2000), the share of bank
credit card balances held by only 10
institutions increased from 43 percent to
63 percent. These banks are the
principal source of information about
consumers￿ payment habits for bank
cards, as well as the principal source of
potential new customers. And during
those five years, consumers were
inundated with offers of credit card
accounts that carried low introductory
interest rates on balances transferred
from other banks. This episode is a
reminder that lenders may not always
choose to share information about their
borrowers.
12  See TransUnion Corp. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 245 F.3d 809 and Individual
Reference Services Group, Inc. (IRSG), v. Federal
Trade Commission et al.,  145 F. Supp. 2d6.
Credit bureau activities may also be affected
by the European Privacy Directive, which is
generally more restrictive than U.S. law.
This directive is reviewed in Fred Cate￿s
book.
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